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ABSTRACT This paper is a response to a graduate seminar 
entitled “Postcolonialism, Globalization, and Education.” 
Using postcolonial and feminist theory, I discuss connections 
between demographic binaries (male/female, black/white) 
and epistemological binaries (rational/emotional, objective/
subjective). I argue that ingrained binary thinking privileges a 
particular epistemology, namely one that is Western, patriarchal, 
and based on rationality and logic, over other ways of thinking 
and knowing, thus invalidating other knowledges, such as 
those based on feeling, emoting, and sensing. In rejecting these 
ways of knowing, we move away from caring, compassion and 
empathy—all necessary tools for dismantling ills such as racism 
and sexism. Accessing and validating these alternative ways of 
knowing might contribute to making our society, our schools, 
and ourselves more whole, more equal, and more human.
KEYWORDS   good, evil, man, woman, binaries, feminism 
“Crazy people are not crazy if one accepts their reasoning” - 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Of Love and Other Demons
Introduction
Binary ways of thinking pervade our culture, implicating 
psyches, minds, and language.  From “good vs. evil” to fine 
lines that separate “black and white” issues to Men From Mars 
and women from Venus  (Gray et al, 1992) these omnipresent 
dualities serve to label, classify, value, and create divisions 
between individuals in communities both local and global 
through the assignment of positive and negative values to 
opposing characteristics. One particularly pernicious effect of 
these divisions is the privileging of a particular epistemology, 
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namely one that is Western, patriarchal, and based on rationality 
and logic, over other ways of thinking and knowing. While there 
are numerous benefits to structured, rational thought, it also 
serves the interests of a specific group of people, while silencing 
others. Equating the logical with the legitimate also invalidates 
other knowledges, such as those based on feeling, emoting, and 
sensing. In effect, truth becomes associated with data and proof, 
and we lose the veracity found in art, narrative, and experience. 
Due to our situation within this epistemology, it can be 
quite difficult to see or accept other ways of knowing. Western 
epistemology is built into American intuitions, education, and 
ways of life.  To illuminate how some knowledges are privileged 
over others and the damaging effects of this preference, I will 
discuss personal experiences as well as analyze excerpts from 
What I Learned in Medical School (Takakuwa et al, 2004), an edited 
collection of essays written by medical students who identify 
with non-dominant groups. Their stories address the tensions 
that arise in a traditionally white, male, heteronormative space 
that educates and grooms future members of a professional and 
intellectual elite. The featured voices express discomfort and 
confusion with an educational system that requires them to 
think and know in ways that negate their sense of self or conflict 
with their values. Through their experiences, as they question 
and struggle with binary thinking and with their assignment 
to the negative pole, they reveal the damage that comes from 
suppressing knowledge and also the ways in which our society 
might heal and progress if we could come to honor all ways of 
thinking and knowing. I will draw from feminist and postcolonial 
theory in an attempt to elucidate their, and my, experiences in 
the context of this current moment in time and place. 
The Binary
While categories of race, spirituality, thought, gender, and 
physicality may seem disparate, I believe that they are in fact 
deeply connected—all part of a single Binary system that assigns 
positive or negative values to opposite poles, and accordingly to 
the individuals identified with each. The recognition of these 
dualities is not inherently harmful, and many non-Western 
knowledge systems include philosophies of opposite forces or 
energies. What is troubling about our conceptions of binaries 
is the value judgment that always accompanies them. Because 
one pole must be judged as superior to the other, inferiority 
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is a necessary result, and disparate ideas and symbols come 
to be understood as oppositional, rather than complementary. 
Feminist scholars Yanagisako and Delaney (1995) question 
visible differences between various incarnations of structural 
inequality: “If the meanings of ‘male’ and ‘female’ are not…just 
about natural differences, this prompts us to explore the ways in 
which these meanings articulate with other inequalities which 
are supposedly structured by other differences. We need to ask 
not how these other inequalities are themselves naturalized…
but how their distinctiveness from gender is naturalized” (pg. 
11). The following chart contains a list of frequently cited 
binaries. I have ordered them so that by reading vertically, the 
reader might make connections between each subsequent item 
in the set. 
Positive Negative
Good Evil
God Devil
Virtuous Sinful
Male Female 
Heavenly Earthly
Light Dark
White Black
Pristine Filthy
Of the Mind Of the Body
Thinking Feeling
Rational Emotional
Theoretical Experiential
Quantitative Qualitative
Objective Subjective
Fact Fiction
With recognition that the above tropes are all pieces of 
a larger system of subjugation, the pairs that I will focus on 
here are those at the bottom of the chart that relate directly 
to knowledge production (thinking/feeling, rational/emotional, 
theoretical/experiential, quantitative/qualitative, objective/
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subjective, fact/fiction). In Western culture, ways of knowing 
that are coded as positive, like rational, logical, objective, 
are legitimized; and negatively coded ways of knowing, like 
emotional, intuitive, experiential are disassociated from truth. 
The latter are not considered “real”, as they are difficult or 
impossible to support with evidence and facts (both “positive” 
types of information). Since emotional, bodily ways of knowing 
cannot be proven the way that quantitative, objective thought 
can, they are eliminated from the canon of what is true, real, 
and worthwhile. In the process, we learn not to listen to our 
bodies, that the mind trumps the heart, and that what we think 
is always more pertinent than what we feel. If some sentiment 
or idea is not logical or explainable, it is not valid; it ought to be 
ignored or explained away. 
Other tropes associated with a privileged rationality are 
whiteness and masculinity, while femininity and blackness are 
linked to a disadvantaged subjectivity (Beard, 2015; Lutz, 1995). 
As a result, “positive” types of knowledge are associated with 
and privilege those whose physical characteristics are similarly 
coded. On the other hand, those who are coded as negative—
women, non-whites, and non-heterosexuals—are not simply 
understood to think in invalid ways, they themselves become 
invalid entities and are positioned as such in cultural hierarchies. 
As Franz Fanon (2008) writes, “We are the chosen people; look at 
the color of our skin; others are black or yellow because of their 
sins.” Here Fanon demonstrates how validating or invalidating 
judgments of moral value are assigned to individuals based on 
racial (or gender, or sexual, or…) categorizations as they align 
with the positive and negative ends of The Binary. 
Significance
The adoption and normalization of superior and inferior binaries 
in the collective psyche and in everyday discourse has severely 
damaging effects on those with inferior assignments. It has 
become clear that traditional Western classificatory schemes 
are stiflingly oppressive, and through protest, organization, and 
engaged scholarship, their flaws are being exposed. Yanagisako 
and Delaney (1995) explain that “with the increasing circulation 
of peoples globally, identities are being fragmented, hyphenated 
and in conflict, and can no longer be put back together in 
the same old way. The verities on which identity—whether of 
gender, sexual orientation, nationality, ethnicity, or religion—
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have traditionally been based no longer provide the answers…
the explanatory schemes upon which identity was based have 
been shown not to rest on the bedrock of fact” (pg. 1). They call 
for a critical examination of the ways in which different types 
of knowledge and information are classified and subsequently 
associated with certain human attributes or characteristics that 
continue to privilege dominant groups and discourses while 
stifling many voices and delegitimizing certain groups of people 
in spaces such as courthouses, classrooms, and churches. 
In addition to severely hindering the ability of these silenced 
individuals to participate with agency within both personal 
relationships and their communities, eschewing other truly 
valuable ways of thinking and knowing harms, fragments, and 
prevents progress in our society and ourselves.
To move our communities toward wholeness and equality, 
I believe that we need to access and mobilize negatively coded 
ways of thinking and knowing. I do not think that policies, 
institutions, or even revolutions conceptualized though privileged 
epistemologies alone will lead to improvement or repair. To break 
through binaries and understand all individuals as valued 
and valid, we need compassion, empathy, and sensitivity—all 
irrational and non-objective. It is through careful examination 
of our epistemologies and their relationship to our identities 
and our conceptualizations of others that we can begin to shift 
them to become more inclusive, more humanizing, more fluid. 
This is work that must be done both in individual minds and 
hearts, and together as a collective. This paper is the beginning 
of one such examination. 
Situating Myself
As I complete this essay, I am concluding my second year 
of graduate studies at the University of Minnesota. My work 
thus far has included explorations into critical theory, critical 
race theory, postcolonialism, feminist and queer studies, 
and poststructuralism, among others. These theories and 
philosophies have helped me to begin to critically examine 
my own identity and position in global and local systems of 
inequality and oppression. I was fortunate to have grown up 
in a suburb of a large liberal and progressive city. As such, my 
community strove to be inclusive of various types of people and 
thought, although this was not always the case, and is still 
not today. My grandmother, a fiercely independent and deeply 
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thoughtful woman, practiced Transcendental Meditation for 
decades, as did many others in my family’s social circle. As 
such I was raised in the purview of alternative worldviews and 
ways of thinking, although I did not actively practice myself. 
As a Middle Eastern, Jewish, American woman I have found 
myself at different times to be assigned to the “good” or “bad” 
ends of binaries, sometimes of the same one. For example, 
racially I appear white, although I am neither Anglo-Saxon nor 
Protestant. While I typically enjoy the privilege that comes with 
being categorized as “white”, there are moments where my Arab 
name, religion, and olive skin and dark eyes code me as non-
white. These moments are few and far between, but elicit a very 
specific, typically negative response in others and contemporarily 
cause me deep discomfort. To me, these experiences expose the 
ruse of binary categories, the fluidity amongst the poles, and 
the folly of assigning positive and negative values to opposite 
ends. In reality, I, and most others, do not fall at one end of 
the binary, but rather inhabit the space in between (Anzaldua, 
1987; Fine, 1994).  These insights have fostered a deeper 
understanding not just of how these binary categories affect 
the they ways we understand orselves and others, but also of 
how they function within institutions. I will now explore some 
of the manifestations of binaries in education. 
Theoretical Framework
I will use the work of postcolonial and feminist scholars to 
discuss the ways in which dualities manifest in discourse and 
practice, and how they consequently damage individuals and 
communities through suppression of non-dominant ways of 
knowing and being. I find the conversation between these two 
schools of thought particularly useful for this application in that 
each aims to legitimize the voices of a particular disenfranchised 
group, yet each approaches the work differently. The original 
aim of feminism was to empower women while legitimizing and 
centering their voices and experiences. Early feminists argued 
both that women were not inferior to men in terms of intelligence 
and intellectualism, and also that female-coded ways of thinking 
were important indicators of reality and of knowledge. Critics, 
however, pointed out that this brand of feminism excluded 
non-white women, IN that it represented women as a white, 
heterosexual, and homogenous group (Narayan, 1997). Over the 
past three decades, third wave feminist thought has attempted 
to move past these hindrances. Scholars such as Audre 
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Lorde and bell hooks have insisted that feminist theory must 
recognize the heterogeneity of the female experience by taking 
up issues of race, nation, and sexuality, among others. In her 
book Woman, Native, Other (1989), feminist and postcolonial 
scholar Trinh Minh-ha invokes Alice Walker, who speaks “of the 
necessity of learning to discern the true feminist—“for whom 
racism is inherently an impossibility”—from the white female 
opportunist—“for whom racism, inasmuch as it assures white 
privilege, is an accepted way of life” (pg. 83). She thus argues that 
one cannot be a feminist and a racist, as contemporary feminist 
theory recognizes that the suppression of any marginalized 
voice - be it feminine, black, homosexual, disabled—supports 
the same hierarchy that oppresses women. They argue that one 
cannot seek to trouble a binary without seeking to trouble The 
Binary. 
Feminist scholars also trouble dominant forms of 
knowledge more directly. In her essay The Gender of Theory 
(1995), Catherine Lutz explains that feminist scholarship 
“directly challenges non-feminist scholarship rather than 
defining itself as simply another specialty working alongside 
colleagues in a neatly partitioned division of labor over the 
social body” (p.251) Feminists do not seek acceptance or higher 
placement within the current hierarchy of knowledge, but 
attempt to subvert it. These efforts, while not always successful 
express an acknowledgement of the value of alternative ways 
of knowing. Accordingly, many feminist scholars push back 
against objectivism and assume a strongly anti-positivist 
stance. Positivism stipulates that empirical inquiry is capable 
of proving the existence of certain natural phenomena and 
constitutes an authoritative body of knowledge. Positivists 
also assume that the social and natural worlds can both be 
accurately described in such a fashion. The feminist rejection 
of positivism represents an epistemological shift that questions 
the hegemony of the scientific method as the primary source of 
knowledge production. 
Feminist theorists seek alternative approaches to inquiry 
not just in terms of the questions asked, but also in terms of 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underlie 
intellectual investigation. Yanagisako and Delaney (1995) have 
argued that even basic assumptions about what we assume is 
“of nature” is not universally so, but rather has been assigned 
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as such by longstanding cultural forces that support certain 
hierarchies. The claim that science is somehow distinct from 
culture naturalizes a hierarchy of knowledge that hinges on the 
nature/culture binary. In refusing the scientific method as the 
most apt way to approach academic inquiry, feminist theorists 
push for the dismantling of a hierarchy of knowledge that is 
embedded with biases, such as racism and sexism (Harding, 
1987). As feminist scholars seek a reinvention and reworking 
of the body of academic knowledge, an anti-positivist stance 
allows for the acceptance of a wider range of individuals who 
are considered knowledge producers, recognition that the social 
world exists differently for individuals viewing it from different 
perspectives, and a much broader and complete understanding 
of what constitutes knowing and being.
Feminism also rejects traditional methods of scientific 
knowledge-seeking that aim to be value-neutral, dispassionate, 
and objective (Harding, 1987). This type of inquiry was, and in 
many disciplines continues to be, the gold standard of empirical 
research. Yet this approach to research naturalizes the objective 
researcher, who, again, has typically been white, heterosexual, 
and male. Feminist theory instead offers an alternative: a 
legitimization of knowledge-seeking that is passionate, ethically-
conscious, and politically motivated. This is among the most 
important contributions of the theory—a call for scholars to 
care, ardently, about their work and its implications, and to 
refuse to apologize for the passion that drives their studies. This 
assertion in itself represents the acceptance and legitimization 
of alternative epistemologies and re-centers emotion, passion, 
compassion, and love.  By pointing to the fallacy of “objectivity”, 
feminists make a strong case for the value of subjectivity and 
for the ability of a subjective lens to illuminate a reality that is 
contextual and historically and temporally situated. 
Finally, feminist theory insists that research and knowledge 
production ought to seek to reimagine the world, not simply 
describe it. In this way, feminism is inherently oriented toward 
social justice. Feminist scholars critique traditional “scientific” 
research questions as benefiting those who ask them, typically 
white, heterosexual males in positions of status or authority. 
As an alternative, feminists call on scholars to focus on the 
questions non-dominant groups might want answered—
inquiries that focus on how to change current conditions and 
128
emancipate oppressed peoples, rather than on those that 
seek Truth (Harding, 1987). In a similar vein, Nancy Fraser 
(2000) calls upon feminist thinkers to push for redistribution of 
resources alongside a redistribution of recognition; she insists 
that tangible, material benefits should accompany a reimaging 
of how we value different voices and viewpoints. Thus research 
that is actionable, that comes with a motive, and questions that 
seek to change or transform are legitimated and encouraged by 
feminist theory.
Postcolonialism similarly attempts to dismantle hierarchies 
through an examination and denouncement of binaries of 
colonizer/colonized and self/other. Postcolonial scholars 
recognize the confusing effects that these binaries have on 
individuals’ hearts and minds. They argue that the colonizers, 
who are Western and white, impose their own ontologies and 
subjectivities on the colonized, who are by definition considered 
“other” in this framework. The colonizers subsequently define 
their own identities by distancing themselves from those they 
colonize, yet cannot fully escape their binary opposite. In 
The Location of Culture (1994), Homi Bhabha writes that the 
colonizer is “tethered to, not confronted by, this dark reflection, 
the shadow of colonized man, that splits his presence, distorts 
his outline, breaches his boundaries, repeats his action at a 
distance, disturbs and divides the very time of his being. (pg. 44). 
Bhabha thus argues that the binary poles of self and other are 
and will always remain tied to each other, that it is impossible 
to completely divorce either. This reluctant but inevitable 
connection results in an otherness of the self, disguised as a 
division of self and other. It is this internal split that causes 
fractures not just within individual souls, but within entire 
communities and societies. 
Like feminism, postcolonialism seeks a revolutionary re-
imagining of the ways knowledges are produced and valued. 
Bhabha (1994) explains that “a struggle against colonial 
oppression not only changes the direction of Western history, 
but challenges its historicist idea of time as a progressive, 
ordered whole. The analysis of colonial depersonalization not 
only alienates the Enlightenment idea of ‘Man”, but challenges 
the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of 
human knowledge” (pg. 41). A struggle against physical and 
economic oppression by colonizers thus necessitates a struggle 
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against their ways of knowing and against their framings of 
reality, which serve to enable their dominance. In this sense 
binaries related to epistemology and binaries that assign 
privilege based on demographic details are tightly intertwined. 
Yet, in the neocolonial world, the colonizers have found ways to 
stifle and contain the arguments against them through the use 
of dominant epistemes. In The Intimate Enemy (1983), Ashis 
Nandy explains that “it is possible today to be anti-colonial in a 
way which is specified and promoted by the modern world view 
as ‘Proper’, ‘sane’ and ‘rational’. Even when in opposition, that 
dissent remains predictable and controlled” (pg. 12). It thus 
follows that access to non-dominant, subjugated knowledges 
is required for real progress; attempts at change built on the 
sanctioned knowledge of the colonizer will only result in a 
reification or reproduction of the hierarchy that supports him.
Postcolonial scholars further address the explicit use of 
binaries to maintain a privileged position by dominant groups in 
the neocolonial world. For example, Edward Said (1978) explains 
the concept of the “Orient” as a homogeneous and romanticized 
cultural concept created by the West to describe the East. 
Because the West created the term, it retains the power to define 
it; consequently the representations of the Orient produced in 
the West are inherently framed by dominant epistemological 
assumptions that devalue the voiceless, othered Orient. Yet while 
the contributions of Said are both valuable and significant, they 
do not manage to fully transcend hierarchical binary thinking. 
While Said is critical of the relationship inherent in the East/
West distinction and insists that it is socially constructed, he 
still relies on these essentialist categories to explain the world. 
Yet some postcolonial scholars, especially those who 
also embrace feminist thought, critique the colonizer/
colonized relationship through a refuation of the existence of 
those categories and a recognition of the fluidity of human 
identity—that one may be both colonizer and colonized in the 
same moment. For example, in her essay Can the Subaltern 
Speak (1988), Gayatri Spivak argues that when describing 
the subaltern, those members of society that exist socially 
and politically outside the realm of colonial power structures, 
scholars typically describe a homogeneous population of 
marginalized people, represented and spoken for by men. She 
insists that the postcolonial project had not gone far enough, 
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that while it sought to legitimate the voices of the subaltern, 
its exclusion of female voices and experiences represented an 
upholding of the Binary as evidenced by a privileging of male 
over female. Spivak further asserts that the dominant ontologies 
imposed by the colonizer are an example of “epistemic violence” 
in that they represent a “project to constitute the colonial 
subject as Other” (pg. 24) by destroying or delegitimizing their 
endemic knowledges; yet she also asserts that “the narrow 
epistemic violence of imperialism gives us an imperfect allegory 
of the general violence that is the possibility of an episteme” 
(pg. 28). She thus recognizes that the colonizer’s imposed ways 
of knowing do more than constitute self/other, they strengthen 
all binary categories and cause harm to multiple elements of an 
individual’s heart and mind. 
Other feminist postcolonial scholars interrogate the 
damaging effects of binary assignments on identity. Nina Asher 
(2005) describes this work as presenting “useful analyses of…
interstitiality and implicatedness…which emerge in cross-
cultural particularly in the present-day, global contexts of 
school and society” (pg. 1080). The usefulness that Asher 
mentions is significant—these scholars use the questioning 
social justice narratives of feminism to mobilize the identity 
work of postcolonialism. For example, as Michelle Fine (1994) 
contends, we must ask “what is, and is not, ‘happening between,’ 
within the negotiated relations of whose story is being told, 
why, to whom, with what interpretation, and whose story is 
being shadowed, why, for whom, and with what consequence” 
(pg. 135). Alternatively, Gloria Anzaldua (1997) argues in 
support of a “mestiza consciousness,” a multidimensional 
subjectivity that would honor marginalized voices and push 
back against hierarchical systems of oppression. This mestiza 
consciousness is achieved through a process of conscientization 
that necessitates a critical awareness of one’s positionality and 
subsequent action to support the repairing of the rifts that 
divide both the self and society. bell hooks (1989) describes 
these transgressions past socially constructed boundaries of 
race, gender, and class “defiant political gesture(s),” and insists 
that the goal of these activities must be to “stand in political 
resistance with the oppressed, ready to offer our ways of seeing 
and theorizing, of making culture, towards that revolutionary 
effort which seeks to create space where there is unlimited access 
to the pleasure and power of knowing, where transformation is 
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possible” (pg. 145). In doing this work, then, it is also important 
to interrogate what ways of seeing and theorizing underlie 
both the text of stories and our understandings of them, as 
we attempt to access alternative understandings that welcome 
previously silenced voices.
Examination
An Eastern Transgression
What I Learned in Medical School (Takakuwa et al, eds. 2004) 
features an essay by Akilesh Palanisamy, who  grew up in a 
traditional Indian family. After his first year of medical school, 
while reflecting on deeper questions about life and reality, he 
became interested in Ayurveda, the traditional medical system of 
India. He took an introductory Ayurveda course in Coimbatore, 
South India, and felt that he had “fallen in love” with the practice, 
which he committed to incorporating into his practice as a doctor 
in the U.S. He titled his essay Seeing with New Eyes.
“Ayurvedic reasoning often proceeds from macrocosm to 
microcosm, relying on an intuitive understanding of the 
whole to define the parts. Conversely, “Western science 
usually begins with smaller units and progresses to 
larger structures, believing that understanding all the 
parts leads to understanding the whole. This difference 
reflects the holistic basis of Ayurvedic thinking and, 
in contrast, the more mechanistic and reductionist 
Western approach.” (Takakuwa et al, eds. 2004 
pg.129)
“With them (other medical students in the US), I agree 
that scientific research is essential, but I also try to 
point out the limitations of science and explain that it 
is only one tool we can use to understand the world. 
I often find it difficult to bridge the gap between these 
different perspectives, however.” (Takakuwa et al, eds. 
2004 pg. 132)
“Eventually, I want to integrate the clinical practices 
of Ayurveda and allopathic medicine. I believe that 
each represents a different but equally valid way of 
understanding health and that both have a great deal 
to contribute to the future of health care.” (Takakuwa 
et al, eds. 2004, pg. 134)
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Through his travels and access to alternative worldviews, 
Palanisamy is able to recognize the limits and shortcomings of 
allopathic (Western) medicine. He focuses on India, a former 
colony, and acknowledges the lesser place its ways of knowing 
occupy in the field of medicine. He calls the Indian system 
“holistic” and the Western system “reductionist,” which reflects 
the exclusionary nature of the Western canon of knowledge. It 
is reductionist because it includes and accepts only one way 
of understanding and one way of validating. This approach 
often ignores context—it operates under a guise of timelessness 
that fails to recognize specificity and situation. In addition, the 
Western knowledge system seeks to reinforce its authority by 
dismissing Ayurveda as “soft”, “hokey”, or “not real science.” 
Palanisamy explains the difficulty in convincing others to 
look beyond these discourses. He describes his connection with 
Ayurveda as “falling in love,” an experience clearly related the 
subjective, emotional, “negative” end of the Binary, yet also one 
he feels is essential to legitimate. Perhaps because of his personal 
connection to and experience with Indian philosophy, he does 
not see this way of understanding as less valid or valuable, 
but acknowledges the tension his perspective creates in spaces 
of Western learning. As Fanon (2008) writes of the colonized: 
“their metaphysics, or less pretentiously their customs and the 
agencies to which they refer, were abolished because they were 
in contradiction with a new civilization that imposed its own” (pg. 
90). Thus the tension that Palanisamy expresses can be read as 
a clash between his love for his family’s ways of knowing and 
the Western ways of knowing that refuse to acknowledge the 
former as legitimate. bell hooks (1989) explains that even when 
marginalized individuals like Palanisamy have access to dominant 
spaces and language, the must travel to the center to collaborate 
with their colleagues—the colonizers will not meet them in the 
margins. Palanisamy’s existence in this centered space and his 
loyalty to Ayurveda are thus actions, forms of resistance against 
the institutional knowledge prescribed by the colonizers.  
Yet the seeming contention between allopathic medicine 
and Ayurveda does not seem to bother Palanisamy. Instead, 
he touts the complementary, rather than oppositional, nature 
of Binary opposites and asserts that together they are stronger 
than either is alone. Here he echoes Anzaldua, who writes 
that, “at the Confluence of two or more genetic streams, with 
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chromosomes constantly “crossing over,” this mixture of races, 
rather than resulting in an inferior being, provides hybrid 
progeny, a mutable, more malleable species with a rich gene 
pool. From this racial, ideological, cultural and biological 
cross-pollination, and “alien” consciousness is presently in 
the making—a new mestizo” (77). Palanisamy is succeeding in 
living in the in between spaces and recognizing and valuing 
within himself the “positive” and “negative” binary poles and 
the productivity their confluence provides. 
Women’s (health) Care 
 Drawing on my own experience in this section, I consider what 
I learned from a close friend of mine, Luke, who graduated from 
medical school, after five years of hard work and grueling hours. 
Throughout that time, we had many opportunities to discuss 
health, medicine, and what it means to provide care. Below is a 
brief conversation that I recall vividly.
After his second year, Luke and his classmates started 
rotations, a time when they began to think seriously about 
which specialization they would chose. Around this time, 
Luke and I had a conversation that has stayed with me. 
When we were discussing his experience in gynecology 
and obstetrics, I expressed my strong preference for female 
physicians, especially in women’s health specialties. I 
was curious why some of his male friends were pursuing 
gynecology. Now that 47% of medical students are female 
(AAMC 2014), shouldn’t there be enough women to fill 
the positions that treat women exclusively? His response 
shocked me. “A majority of women, studies show, 
prefer male obstetricians and gynecologists to female 
practitioners.” What? How could this be? Of course there 
are plenty of talented and competent male OB/GYNs, but 
none of them have lived in female body, and consequently 
none have experienced, for example, the physicality of the 
female reproductive system.  I spent a long time mulling 
over this statistic (which, admittedly, I have not been able 
to confirm), feeling confused and almost betrayed by it. 
Aren’t we, as women, able enough to care for our own 
bodies without requiring consult from men? Why do male 
doctors, because of their gender, have so much more 
perceived authority female doctors (and what of those 
individuals who do not identify neatly as either)? 
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I think this interaction attests to the naturalization of hierarchies 
through discourse. Cultural discourses can become so ingrained 
in our psyches that they become impossible to move beyond 
without critical thought and radical re-envisioning. My above 
conversation  is an example of how binaries related to gender 
and to knowledge are one and the same. Men are so strongly 
associated with rationality, truth, and intelligence, that their 
gender alone can serve to position their speech and actions 
favorably (Beard 2015). This is representative of how obdurate 
the male/female manifestation of the Binary can be. Trinh 
Minh-Ha (1989) describes the duality concisely: “man thinks, 
woman feels.” Her pithy sentence shows how rational thought 
is an inherent element of maleness, while femininity can’t exist 
without feeling and emotion. The women who prefer the care 
of male OB/GYNs have internalized these categories. Whether 
stated directly or not, these discourses shape women to be less 
intelligent, less capable, and less authoritative than their male 
counterparts. 
These assumptions about women follow them into 
professional spaces, and are particularly powerful in official 
sites of knowledge production. For example, of the place of 
women in academia, Lutz (1995) writes, “to the extent that 
women are seen as less intelligent, their writing will be seen as 
less theoretical, no matter how they write” (pg. 259). Minh-Ha 
(1989) argues similarly that writing is a male-aligned activity, 
as good writing is clear, impersonal, and rational. Women 
often receive different feedback than men- they are supposed 
to write about themselves and their bodies, perhaps in the 
style of diary entries, because that is how “women writers” 
are expected to write. Thus the quality of women’s work or of 
their scholarship doesn’t matter because in light of hegemonic 
discourses the simple fact that they are female makes them 
lesser. Consequently, female patients prefer male physicians 
because the qualities that supposedly make a good physician, 
objectivity, intelligence, authority, are embodied not in “doctor” 
but in “man.”
So gender roles are naturalized in the social context of 
classificatory schemes. Yanagisako and Delaney (1995) write, 
“the social [is] embedded in the natural, but in a particular 
version of it” (pg. 5). So social conceptualizations of gender 
come to be considered part of nature, but the contexts under 
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which that specific nature was created, and by whom, for 
whom so often goes unexamined. In Black Skin, White Masks 
Franz Fanon succeeds in troubling male/female duality by 
invoking natural imagery: “Beware of rhythm, the Mother 
Earth bond, and that mystic, carnal marriage between man 
and the cosmos” (pg. 104). And, “Long live the bond between 
Man and the Earth!” (pg. 106). By articulating the connection 
between Man (positive) and the Earth, which he describes as 
the female Mother, he intentionally confuses binary poles in 
a call for their dismantling. He describes a “carnal” (of the 
body, feminine, negative) relationship between man (positive) 
and the cosmos (positive) to trouble belief in the existence of 
oppositional opposites. By scrambling the Binary, Fanon at 
once problematizes and mocks it. 
Objectifying Learning, Intellectualizing Illness
Kevin Takakuwa’s essay in What I Learned in Medical School 
(2004) describes how he left a career in business to attend 
medical school to learn how to “medically care” for members 
of his community. Once at school, he was quickly disillusioned 
by the lack of care, of any variety, in the medical school 
environment. In his essay, seven years into prerequisites and 
medical school courses, he recounts how he grappled with this 
contradiction. 
“Grant, a new classmate who was bicycling off campus 
with me during our first month of school, spoke with 
shameless optimism about the powers of medicine and 
described medical school as a “privilege” that granted 
us the ability to indulge in academic pursuits without 
being bothered by the same day-to-day worries as 
others—like getting a job or earning a real living. Images 
flashed at me: consoling a close college friend who had 
just seroconverted to HIV-positive; then, several years 
later, standing over his ravaged, lifeless body. I turned 
my attention back to Grant. He continued on about 
how our minds would be spared these annoyances 
so that we could focus on the important “intellectual” 
challenge ahead. I wondered what happy drug he was 
taking.“ (Takakuwa et al, eds. 2004, pg. 93)
“Everyone but me seemed to know the rules of 
appropriate topics. When I tried to talk about the lack 
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of available tutors, the school’s dismissal policies, the 
possibility of converting from an inherently competitive 
grading system to a pass/no pass system, or improving 
the curriculum and teaching, I was ignored, discounted, 
or attacked.” (Takakuwa et al, eds. 2004, pg. 96)
“My convictions and morals began to haunt me. I refused 
to study old exams, a practice I believed was unethical 
and counterproductive to real understanding. I wanted 
to learn conceptually, to know the purpose behind the 
information. But there was no time for this, and there 
was no efficient way for me to grasp the material. I 
tried to adapt, altering my strategies iteration after 
iteration, but to no avail. Every quarter, I struggled to 
pass. Sometimes I hovered around the class mean, but 
other times I fell to the lower end of the grading curve. 
As the quarters ground on, I couldn’t avoid hearing the 
gossip that separated people into categories: smart or 
dumb.” (Takakuwa et al, eds. 2004, pg. 97)
Takakuwa experiences this Western system of education and 
knowledge production as painful and confusing. The death 
of his friend left him with a conceptualization of health and 
health care as personal, visceral, bodily, and emotional. His 
fellow student’s assertion that medicine was an “intellectual” 
challenge, which accurately reflected the medical school 
curriculum, seemed absurd to him. How could he attempt 
to cure and care from a perspective that was academic and 
impersonal? And how could he learn to be a good physician 
when he was not afforded the time to think deeply and to 
reflect? The role of physicality and emotion in the medical 
school curriculum is unique given that the content focuses on 
bodies and ways to cure them. As Takakuwa notices, there is 
an inherent contradiction in medical classrooms when Western 
knowledges insist on viewing the body objectively, but the 
experiences of the patient and the physician are unavoidably 
subjective, physical, and often, emotional. Darder argues that 
Western epistemologies ignore the body’s ways of knowing and 
thinking to the severe detriment of students. She writes, “the 
production of knowledge (in the classroom) is neither engaged nor 
presented as a historical and collective process, occurring in the 
flesh and its sensual capacities for experiencing and responding 
to the world” (pg. 218). She thus explains a disconnection in 
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the way that knowledge is produced and taught. She argues 
that knowing is inherently physical, that it cannot be separated 
from the body, and that strictly objective perspectives obscure 
many forms of truth. Darder quotes Christopher Beckey: ‘The 
flesh, the material aspect of the body, is seen as a hindrance 
which must be overcome, negated, and transcended’ as if it were 
not involved in the act of knowing at all” (pg. 218). Takakawa, 
aware of essential role of emotion and physicality in learning, is 
unable to excel in a curriculum that he sees as ineffective, rote, 
and pointless. There is no place for other types of knowledges, 
and when he problematizes this, he is “ignored, discounted, or 
attacked.” This response is similar to the cultural invalidation 
of emotional and subjective knowledges. 
As Takakuwa comes to understand medicine as competitive, 
unfriendly, and impersonal, he loses the impetus to identify as 
a physician. As Bhabha writes, “the question of identification 
is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-
fulfilling prophecy—it is always the production of an image 
of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming 
that image” (pg. 45). Here Takakuwa struggles against that 
identity and refuses to assume that image. While this results 
in his inability to succeed within his school, he succeeds in 
coming to understand the purpose behind the information, in 
thinking critically, and in reflecting. bell hooks might describe 
Takakuwa as trying to maintain an oppositional worldview from 
the margins, a place from which he can look “both from the 
outside in and from the inside out” (pg. 149). hooks explains that 
these experiences can be immensely painful, but that in these 
spaces exist the tools for change, and that by even continuing 
to exist also in the center, Takakuwa was performing an act of 
resistance.
Oma’s Favourites 
In this section, I share a memory from my childhood about my 
grandmother. When I was a little girl, my parents, my siblings, 
and I would go frequently to visit my grandmother, Oma, who 
lived about twenty minutes from us. Below is a memory that 
has stayed with me.
Oma’s house was a place to play—a garden filled with 
earthworms and ladybugs, myriad closets and corners for hide 
and seek, and drawers with “secret” stashes of candy. Part of our 
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play also involved our grandmother. “Oma, what is your favorite 
color” I would ask while coloring. “Oma, what is your favorite 
food” at dinner. Oma’s answer to these questions was always 
the same. “I don’t have favorites.” “Why not?” I would reply. 
“Because if I pick a favorite, then the rest have to be worse.” As 
a child these refusals to engage frustrated me. As an adult, I see 
that maybe Oma was on to something…
My grandmother in her own way, was refusing to recognize 
the superiority of one Binary pole. She was asserting the 
problematic of “better.” She was also, on the smallest scale, 
disrupting dominant discourses. She was working, in the 
moments she could, to explain something to her grandchildren, 
to direct their educations. She was teaching that it is okay 
to eschew “the demand of identification—that is to be for an 
Other— (which) entails the representation of the subject in the 
differentiating order of otherness” (Bhabha 1994 pg.45). Oma 
was by no means a simple person, and many days she couldn’t 
even stand to be a pleasant one. But Oma thought deeply, and 
she committed herself to a life of learning both intellectually 
and spiritually. Sometimes she shared her wisdom with me, I 
like to think in moments of love. Oma is proof that this work 
of creating wholeness through compassion and love can be 
done not just on a large scale, but also in the minutiae of our 
everyday lives. 
Treating Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
 Heather Goff is a first-year medical student who has struggled 
with depression and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) for 
several years. In her essay in What I Learned in Medical School 
(2004), she discusses the stigma surrounding issues of mental 
health and how her experiences inform her identity as a student 
and her future practice as a physician. 
“Why would anyone stop taking their medication, given 
the severity of OCD symptoms? I’ve asked the same 
question of other patients. Treatment compliance is 
always an issue in any type of patient care. In psychiatric 
care, the problem is compounded by cultural beliefs 
and the stigma surrounding mental illness. Although 
intellectually I understand that antidepressants treat 
brain chemistry in the same way that insulin treats 
blood glucose chemistry, on an emotional level I have 
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great difficulty coming to terms with taking psychiatric 
medications. It’s one thing to take antibiotics because 
you get an infection. The infection isn’t your fault; it 
can happen to anyone. But taking medication because 
you feel “sad” all the time makes you suspect that 
something is wrong with you, not just your chemicals.” 
(Takakuwa et al, eds. 2004, pg. 51)
“Scientists are supposed to look at information with a 
clear eye and an open mind. As physicians-in-training, 
we are supposed to listen to patients’ problems in that 
same objective manner. But how do I do that? How 
can I sit and listen to a depressed patient without 
remembering some of my own pain? How can I watch a 
patient with OCD go through a compulsion and not be 
drawn to my own compulsive behavior?” (Takakuwa et 
al, eds. 2004, pg. 52)
Goff struggles to find her identity despite the seeming 
contradictions that envelop her. At once she is doctor and patient, 
tasked with and in need of curing. In her writing she navigates 
these “split-affinities.” (Fine, 1994). She also struggles to 
discern the boundaries of the physical and nontangible aspects 
of her condition. An infection, for example, though invisible is 
tangible; it can be separated from the self. A psychiatric disorder, 
on the other hand, is harder to conceptualize as material and 
becomes associated with identity. Because of her illness, there 
is a problem with her mind (the site of objective reasoning) 
that results in an excessive amount of emotion, which is coded 
negatively. The juxtaposition of the way she feels and the way 
she is seen attests to the fact that “these dynamic borders are 
not only without, they are also within” (Asher, 2002 pg. 86). 
Goff expresses that the alternative way of knowing that she 
has attained through her experience with illness may hinder 
her ability to work as a physician. She is expected to look with 
a “clear eye” and listen in an “objective manner,” but she does 
not feel that these ways of thinking support or reflect her as 
an individual. She believes in the worth of emotional, feeling, 
feminine ways of knowing and thinking, but understands that 
she is not supposed to draw on her personal experiences in 
the profession of medicine. Goff is acutely aware of the damage 
caused by this rift between objective and subjective, between 
personal and professional. 
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Catherine Lutz (1995) explains how “the masculine bias 
of the canon exemplifies a wider process by which hegemonic 
discourses—especially on gender and race—are established, 
how “uncomfortable information” is erased from public view” 
(pg. 250). In Goff’s case, the realities of her disorder are 
“uncomfortable”. They are awkward to bring up, even in a 
medical setting, and they are thus ignored as if they did not 
exist. Of course they do exist, which causes Goff to feel silenced, 
knowing that if she chooses to discuss them she may well be 
dismissed as “emotional” or “irrational.” These hegemonic labels 
also entail a dehumanizing process. Since “men” (or people) are 
defined by their virtue, their rationality, and consequently their 
whiteness and maleness, labels that pertain to the “negative” 
binary pole strip those assigned to them of their humanity. A 
black man is inherently not a man, because a man is not defined 
by the negative binary pole. Geoff, who is identified as “sick” 
and “emotional”, also experiences dehumanization through 
debasement of her ways of thinking and knowing. 
Yet feminist intellectual traditions would insist on the 
validity of Geoff’s yearnings. Feminists would maintain that 
Geoff should incorporate her own experiences and feelings into 
her practice because they constitute knowledge that is just as 
valuable as that which she can access through her textbooks. 
Drawing upon her subjectivities might also allow Geoff to provide 
care that is more compassionate, personal, and kind. In doing 
so, Geoff might be able to further conceptualize a notion of care 
that is more broadly conceived and that might lead to better 
treatment of her patients. 
Conclusion
Western epistemologies codify hierarchies by ranking individuals 
based on their assignments to positive or negative binary 
categories, and reinforcing, through cultural discourses, specific 
versions of truth and reality that support the existence of said 
hierarchies. In addition to promulgating structural inequality, 
these categorizations represent false truisms that often manage 
to avoid examination and analysis, and are reproduced in 
schools and universities under the guise of “traditional” or 
“classical” learning and rhetoric.  Positive and negative binary 
assignments, especially as they relate to ways of thinking 
and knowing, are problematic for several reasons. First, the 
existence of binaries as they are known and conceptualized is a 
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deception. Ideological categories such as subjective and objective 
are nearly impossible to enact in practice. Even in the “hard” 
sciences, objectivity can be an illusion. For example, the viewing 
of the movement of quantum particles is not a truly objective 
endeavor. Scientists know that their measuring devices cause 
particles to act in different ways than they do when they are not 
under observation. Thus knowledge of their nature is inherently 
influenced by the subjective gaze of the researcher. Similarly, 
when we seek to understand the nature of a phenomenon like 
love, it is the passion and subjectivity of poetry and literature 
that come closest to providing an objective description. So even 
those things imagined to be most objective or most subjective 
in fact exist in Anzaldua’s mestiza, in Fine’s hyphens, and in 
Asher’s interstices (Anzaldua, 1987; Asher, 2005; Fine, 1994). 
Second, these binary extremes of fact and fiction do not 
exist, yet they are understood as real because they are defined 
as material. While thinking and feeling are both immaterial 
processes, we understand them as concrete because they are 
defined as located within certain parts of the body. Thinking is 
done in the head, more specifically in the brain. We can measure 
it quantitatively. We can see its movement on a screen. Thought 
then becomes a thing that can claim as it’s opposite another 
thing, feeling. Feeling is located in the heart, or in the gut. We 
can explain it through hormones and chemicals, we can see it in 
expressions and hear it in voices. By materializing the abstract, 
we constrict its movement. By asserting that thinking and 
feeling are real and defined, we negate the possibility of an in-
between space. By claiming that thinking is superior to feeling, 
we debase feeling and all of the knowledges associated with 
it. We create a hierarchy where everything closer to thinking 
is better, everything closer to feeling is worse, and all of the 
other binary categories associated with the two, along with the 
individuals they ensnare, are also assigned progressive values 
in the hierarchy. 
Third, the valuing of one end of the imagined binary over 
the other, the assertion that objectivity, rationality, and theory 
are valid ways of knowing while subjectivity, emotionality, 
and experience are not, preclude us from accessing the tools 
necessary for recognition and acceptance of other ways of 
thinking and being.  Privileged knowledges allow us to analyze, 
to compare, and to describe, but delegitimized knowledges allow 
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us to care, to empathize, to feel. These are the radical ways 
of knowing ourselves and understanding each other that have 
the power to break down walls of ideology and to build new 
connections that honor all ways of knowing as equally valid 
and equally valuable. Postcolonial feminist scholars assert the 
value of emotional, affective, and psychic tools in this endeavor 
(Asher, 2005). But potent discourses that constantly abase 
and dismiss feeling and emotion protect the reign of rational 
objectivity as supreme, as better than. Thus the protection of 
the privileged and the negation of the suppressed go hand in 
hand. Without the right tools walls cannot be made to crumble, 
and without access to or awareness of those tools, we might not 
even recognize that the walls exists. 
Lastly, it is important that we recognize the harm that we 
endure and inflict by ignoring the knowledge that our emotions, 
our bodies, and our intuitions produce. This harm can be seen 
in classrooms where students are not taught to think deeply or 
understand profoundly, in hospital rooms where patients are 
treated with logic rather than care, and in potentially dangerous 
situations when rational thinking cannot lead us to make the 
right choices. The assertion that there is one correct, superior way 
to know that is universally more useful irrespective of context, 
creates fractures in our society and divides and categorizes 
us. Rather than see these differences as complimentary and 
in harmony, we see them as oppositional and in conflict. This 
idea is performative in that the action of putting one ideal in 
opposition to another creates the conflict, and not the other 
way around. How then, do we heal these rifts and breaks? How 
can we make ourselves and our communities more whole and 
more healthy? Perhaps Gloria Anzaldua (1987) says it best: 
“The future depends on the breaking down of paradigms, it 
depends on the straddling of two or more cultures. By creating 
a new mythos—that is, a change in the way we perceive reality, 
the way we see ourselves, and the ways we behave—la mestiza 
creates a new consciousness” (pg. 80). So healing will require 
an examination not just of what we know, but of how and 
why we know and think. We need to ask ourselves how our 
epistemologies, as engrained as they are in our culture and 
our minds, inherently promote some and silence others, while 
stymieing our collective human quest for understanding and 
truth. I also believe that we ought to strive for ways of thinking 
and being that cease to value binary poles, but instead consider 
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them equal, complementary ends of a vibrant spectrum of 
difference. If we can move in this direction on both personal 
and collective levels, we might contribute to making our society 
and ourselves more whole, more equal, more compassionate, 
and more human. 
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